Over the past 30 years, merger control has become well-established around the world with broad consensus around its ambit and objectives. That consensus has fractured in recent years. Enforcement today is at a critical juncture, facing an array of challenges and calls for reform unprecedented in their scope and intensity. Authored by leading legal practitioners, economists, enforcers, and jurists, this timely Research Handbook on Global Merger Control discusses various critiques that have been made and considers an array of jurisdictional, procedural, substantive, and other issues that are generating intense debate across the antitrust community. These include the scope and objectives of merger control, whether merger control can be reconciled with industrial policy, whether the consumer welfare standard is an appropriate tool for substantive assessment, whether merger control should be used to meet broader policy objectives, and whether existing rules and presumptions are appropriate for the digital age. This Handbook will be of great value to anyone interested in global merger control, digital markets, industrial policy, and the role of public interest considerations. It provides an excellent tool for academics and practitioners looking to gain a rounded view of current issues in global merger control and an understanding of how enforcement is likely to evolve.

This incisive Research Handbook identifies and assesses the emerging trends in competition enforcement, investigating how such changes impact the enforcement approach of competition authorities and the behaviour of companies in an ever-evolving business and regulatory environment. Insightful contributions from experts in the field of competition enforcement law cover anticompetitive agreements, unilateral conduct, and merger control, as well as exploring topics such as algorithmic collusion, market power and data, big data, industrial policy, consumer welfare, common ownership, and competition enforcement in digital platforms. Combining academic, practitioner, and enforcer perspectives, this expansive Handbook sheds light on topical developments concerning competition enforcement, representing an expansion of existing enforcement practices. The Handbook concludes by considering how competition authorities could address the proliferating competition enforcement challenges arising from the appearance of new markets, novel business models, and technological developments. Bringing together unique perspectives on new trends affecting competition enforcement, this timely Handbook will prove invaluable to law firms with an international competition or merger law practice, as well as to economic consultants and competition and regulatory authorities. Comprehensive and accessible, its analysis of the latest developments and perspectives in competition enforcement establish the Handbook as essential reading material for scholars of law and business across the globe.

This book addresses the phenomenon of mergers that may result in non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets. Such cases are sometimes referred to as "non-collusive oligopolies", or "gap cases" and there is a concern that they might not be covered by the substantive test that some Member States use for merger assessment. Ioannis Kokkoris examines the argument that the European Community Merger Regulation (Regulation 4064/89) did not capture gap cases and considers the extent to which the revised substantive test in Regulation 139/2004 deals with the problem of non-collusive oligopolies. The author identifies actual examples of mergers that gave rise to a problem of non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets, both in the EU and in other jurisdictions, and analyses the way in which these cases were dealt with in practice. The book considers legal systems such as United Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand. The book investigates whether there is any difference in the assessment of non-collusive oligopolies between the various substantive tests which have been adopted for merger assessment in various jurisdictions. The book also looks at the various methodological tools available to assist competition authorities and the professional advisers of merging firms to identify whether a particular merger might give rise to anticompetitive effects and explores the type of market structure in which a merger is likely to lead to non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets.

This book addresses the phenomenon of mergers that may result in non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets. Such cases are sometimes referred to as "non-collusive oligopolies," or "gap cases" and there is a concern that they might not be covered by the substantive test that some Member States use for merger assessment. Ioannis Kokkoris examines the argument that the European Community Merger Regulation (Regulation 4064/89) did not capture gap cases and considers the extent to which the revised substantive test in Regulation 139/2004 deals with the problem of non-collusive oligopolies.

The author identifies actual examples of mergers that gave rise to a problem of non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets, both in the EU and in other jurisdictions, and analyses the way in which these cases were dealt with in practice. The book considers legal systems such as United Kingdom, United States, Australia and New Zealand. The book investigates whether there is any difference in the assessment of non-collusive oligopolies between the various substantive tests which have been adopted for merger assessment in various jurisdictions. The book also looks at the various methodological tools available to assist competition authorities and the professional advisers of merging firms to identify whether a particular merger might give rise to anticompetitive effects and explores the type of market structure in which a merger is likely to lead to non-coordinated effects in oligopolistic markets.

The ultimate goal of competition law is to promote competition and, in most jurisdictions, to enhance consumer welfare. Competition policy may be set aside due to special and exceptional circumstances, such as a financial crisis that threatens the stability of an economy. It is therefore important to have a clear understanding of competition law and the exceptions to it. The key issue that this book addresses is whether a financial crisis can justify the adoption of a more lenient approach to established legal standards as a result of the risks of the systemic crisis to the entire market. It provides an analysis of exceptions to competition law and policy, particularly in the context of a financial crisis, explores the rationale of competition law in the light of conflicting interests, and serves as a valuable practical guide for policy makers as well as practitioners in the field.

With incisive and thought-provoking contributions from both leading academics and practitioners, this book addresses in detail the major areas in relation to the Commission Guidance Paper on Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty (now Article 102). The paper has been at the center of much of the recent debate on antitrust policy in Europe and has generated significant controversy and intense debate. The authors contend that the guidance from the Commission is on the one hand entirely justifiable in its focus on consumer harm in identifying what constitutes an abuse, but that on the other it is not consistent enough in its message, nor indeed does it offer enough structural guidance on the practical application of the approach. The book addresses all of these concerns, considers the reform of article 102, and identifies the challenges inherent in its enforcement, looking for instance at enforcement in certain sectors, such as the high tech sector. The book considers recent seminal antitrust cases such as the Microsoft case to illuminate and better understand abuse of dominance. It brings a line of clarity to often contradictory messages and in so doing provides invaluable practical guidance to enforcers and practitioners alike.
The editors combine the insight of a leading international economist and an experienced antitrust scholar, and the contributions are linked by a common emphasis on a strong economic approach to antitrust enforcement.